اقتصاد سیاسی اوپک
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|43461||2015||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12410 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Economics, Volume 48, March 2015, Pages 203–216
We develop a conceptual model that captures OPEC pricing behavior, and apply it to explain the large gap observed between domestic fuel prices in OPEC countries and prices in the rest of the world. We model OPEC as a cartel of nations, not firms, and assume that politicians use two instruments: production quotas and domestic fuel consumption subsidies. The cartel-of-nations model suggests that introduction of alternatives to petroleum products may lead OPEC to reduce exports and increase domestic fuel consumption. The empirical analysis suggests that when OPEC sets production quotas, it places similar weights on consumer and producer surplus. But when OPEC countries set domestic fuel subsidies, on average 6% more weight is given to consumer surplus with some of the OPEC countries pursuing very aggressive domestic cheap fuel policies.