تورم تعارض و تثبیت تاخیر
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|45303||2014||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 39, Part A, March 2014, Pages 171–184
There are numerous political economy approaches to the question of delayed stabilizations. However, all these approaches regard inflation as the unintentional result of the behavior of interest groups. In this paper we take the opposite view, namely, that when there is polarization of financial wealth, inflation is used as a tax to transfer the burden of stabilization onto some interest groups. In countries characterized by financial polarization, stabilization can occur only when there is a change in the political and economic equilibrium, and when parties which represent interest groups adverse to inflation support a new government coalition. The estimates of a Probit model support this hypothesis: the stabilizations after World War I and after the Great Inflation of the 1970s in several European countries showed remarkable political regularities. In fact, generally, these stabilizations occurred when there was a reversal of the political-economic equilibrium and government coalitions including rentiers’ representatives took power.