تخصیص منابع بر اساس اقتصاد خرد در شبکه های پوشش با استفاده از مدل سازی رفتار غیراستراتژیک
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|45842||2011||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||10579 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, Volume 16, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 493–508
Behavior modeling has recently been investigated for designing self-organizing mechanisms in the context of communication networks in order to exploit the natural selfishness of the users with the goal of maximizing the overall utility. In strategic behavior modeling, the users of the network are assumed to be game players who seek to maximize their utility with taking into account the decisions that the other players might make. The essential difference between the aforementioned researches and this work is that it incorporates the non-strategic decisions in order to design the mechanism for the overlay network. In this solution concept, the decisions that a peer might make does not affect the actions of the other peers at all. The theory of consumer-firm developed in microeconomics is a model of the non-strategic behavior that we have adopted in our research. Based on it, we have presented distributed algorithms for peers’ “joining” and “leaving” operations. We have modeled the overlay network as a competitive economy in which the content provided by an origin server can be viewed as commodity and the origin server and the peers who multicast the content to their downside are considered as the firms. On the other hand, due to the dual role of the peers in the overlay network, they can be considered as the consumers as well. On joining to the overlay economy, each peer is provided with an income and tries to get hold of the service regardless to the behavior of the other peers. We have designed the scalable algorithms in such a way that the existence of equilibrium price (known as Walrasian equilibrium price) is guaranteed.