دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 46063
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

درگیری ذینفعان و سیاست تقسیم سود

عنوان انگلیسی
Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
46063 2012 13 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 36, Issue 10, October 2012, Pages 2852–2864

ترجمه کلمات کلیدی
شکل سازمانی - حاکمیت شرکتی - سهامداران - سود سهام - بانک ها
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی
G34; G35Organizational form; Corporate governance; Stakeholders; Dividends; Banks
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  درگیری ذینفعان و سیاست تقسیم سود

چکیده انگلیسی

This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.