دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 46073
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

جبران خسارت مخفیکاری: آیا مدیران اجرائی دستمزد خود را با نفوذ در سیاست تقسیم سود افزایش میدهند؟

عنوان انگلیسی
Stealth compensation: Do CEOs increase their pay by influencing dividend policy? ☆
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
46073 2014 20 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 25, April 2014, Pages 435–454

ترجمه کلمات کلیدی
جبران خسارت های اجرایی - سیاست پرداخت - عملکرد شرکت - حاکمیت شرکتی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی
M41; M52; J33Executive compensation; Payout policy; Firm performance; Corporate governance
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  جبران خسارت مخفیکاری: آیا مدیران اجرائی دستمزد خود را با نفوذ در سیاست تقسیم سود افزایش میدهند؟

چکیده انگلیسی

Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on unvested restricted stocks grants, also known as stealth compensation. Examining all S&P 500 firms over the period 2003–2007, we find that more than half of the dividend paying firms allow this practice. We look at whether this form of compensation reduces agency costs or decreases value for shareholders. We find that CEOs' stealth compensation amounts to an average of $180,000 in additional income, which increases the CEOs' cash compensation and total compensation by 9% and 2% respectively. Firms engaging in stealth compensation have higher dividend payout ratios than those not allowing stealth compensation. For all firms using stealth compensation, there is a reduction in average ROA and Tobin's Q over the long run. However, stealth compensation companies with potential agency issues see a meaningful improvement in their long run performance. For weakly governed companies, stealth compensation may act as a bonding mechanism which may serve to reduce agency costs and therefore increase shareholder value.