دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 47678
عنوان فارسی مقاله

هدف تورمی صریح به عنوان یک دستگاه تعهد

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
47678 2008 26 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
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عنوان انگلیسی
An explicit inflation target as a commitment device
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 30, Issue 1, March 2008, Pages 43–68

کلمات کلیدی
هدف صریح و روشن - هدفگذاری تورمی - تعهد - سفتی - استقلال بانک مرکزی - بازی حرکت متناوب
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پیش نمایش مقاله هدف تورمی صریح به عنوان یک دستگاه تعهد

چکیده انگلیسی

This paper shows an avenue through which a numerical long-run inflation target ensures low inflation and high credibility; one that is independent of the usual Walsh incentive contract. Our novel game theoretic framework – a generalization of alternating move games – formalizes the fact that since the target is explicit (legislated), it cannot be frequently reconsidered. This ‘explicitness’ therefore serves as a commitment device. There are two key results. First, it is shown that if the inflation target is sufficiently rigid/explicit relative to the public’s wages, low inflation is time consistent and hence credible even if the policymaker’s output target is above potential. Second, it is found that the central banker’s optimal explicitness level is decreasing in the degree of his patience/independence (due to their substitutability in achieving credibility). Our analysis therefore offers an explanation for the ‘inflation and credibility convergence’ over the past two decades as well as the fact that inflation targets were legislated primarily by countries that had lacked central bank independence like New Zealand, Canada, and the UK rather than the US, Germany, or Switzerland. We show that there exists fair empirical support for all the predictions of our analysis.

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