فرار مالیاتی و روانشناسی قرارداد اجتماعی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|47783||2003||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The Journal of Socio-Economics, Volume 32, Issue 2, May 2003, Pages 111–125
In a common assumption of the economics of tax evasion, extending beyond the basic Allingham–Sandmo model, the choice of a taxpayer to evade taxes depends upon the perceived fairness of the tax system. The purpose of the paper is to provide a psychological foundation for this assumption by drawing on Hayek’s theory of human behavior as a process of rule following. According to the main hypothesis, taxpayers are more compliant with tax laws to which they can in principle give their full consent. People tend to keep to a conceptual social contract at least in some degree like to contracts of a more ordinary kind because of limitations on their information and cognition, generalized conditioning and feelings of self-determination.