آیا مقاصد سیاسی فرار مالیاتی را تحت تاثیر قرار می دهد؟
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|47792||2008||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 30, Issue 3, May–June 2008, Pages 401–415
For quite sometime, tax evasion has attracted many researchers’ attention in the field of public finance. Not enough attention, however, has been paid to the effects of political factors on tax evasion. This paper intends to provide an economic model of tax evasion, considering the interactions between tax authority and its sovereign government. It shows that tax evasion is influenced by the government's intention to control the economy, controlling for other determinants of tax evasion. The theoretical predictions are examined with annual data from the competitiveness reports published by the IMD and the WEF. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical model to a large extent.