مالیات بر درآمد مطلوب با حضور اثرات وضعیت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|47932||2001||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8752 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Public Economics, Volume 81, Issue 2, August 2001, Pages 193–212
The existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter-acting distortion. The question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule. The answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule, unless the rich are more concerned with status-seeking than the poor. On the other hand, status-seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased. Essentially, the analysis of status-seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule, and can be incorporated into the Diamond [American Economic Review 88 (1998) 83–95] approach.