تخصیص بهینه دارایی های جانبی جایگزین بین وام های مختلف
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|48020||2015||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume 34, November 2015, Pages 22–41
This paper studies loan collateral and relationship banking. A firm has different loans (e.g. short-term and long-term loans) and alternative collateral assets. How does it allocate the collateral assets between the loans? It optimally secures a long-term loan with collateral that incurs high information costs initially and has a strong learning effect during the loan period (e.g. accounts receivables). A short-term loan is secured with collateral that requires low information investment and has a weak learning effect (e.g. government bonds). It is optimal to secure long-term loans with long-term collateral and short-term loans with short-term collateral. If the loan period is short, unsecured lending may be optimal.