رابطه تامین مالی سرمایه گذاری مخاطره آمیز بنیانگذاران سریالی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|48173||2013||27 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||16579 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Financial Intermediation, Volume 22, Issue 3, July 2013, Pages 308–334
I study how often and why a serial founder receives financing for his new company from a venture capital (VC) firm that also invested in his previous company. One in 10 VC investments leads to a repeated relationship and one in three serial founders enters into a repeated relationship with any previous VC firm. A repeated relationship is more likely when the relational VC firm has acquired more private information about the founder, but less likely if the founder’s new venture has a bad fit with the VC firm’s geographic or industry focus. My findings add to the literature on relational financing by showing that the preservation of information is an important motivation for relational financing when screening and monitoring costs are high. Yet, repeated relationships are discontinued because investors also respond to information problems by specializing in certain types of firms. Finally, I find evidence of non-relational investments being passed onto trusted VC syndication partners.