انحراف مرحله سرمایه گذاری و انگیزه های مدیریتی سرمایه گذاری مخاطره آمیز
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|48214||2015||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8550 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 33, August 2015, Pages 118–128
This paper investigates VC investment stage drifts as explained by the outcomes of managerial incentive schemes under different financial market conditions and past return performances. We exploit a unique dataset containing data for all of the venture capital funds in Europe that received financial support from the European Investment Fund (EIF) during the years 1998–2007. The dataset includes 149 VC funds that invested in 1925 companies. We find that a higher hurdle rate produces a compensation incentive that discourages VC managers from lowering funds' risk. We also observe that more reputable fund managers are less likely to increase risk by downward stage drifting and more likely to play it safe by following upward stage drifting strategies. Finally, managers of funds with a poor past performance appear to be less keen to perform stage drifts towards less risky stages, relative to well-performing fund managers. The latter evidence is more significant in periods of bull financial markets.