قرارداد مالی با سرمایه گذاران استراتژیک: شواهدی از سرمایه گذاری مخاطره آمیز شرکت های بزرگ با پشتوانه عرضه اولیه اوراق بهادار
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|48219||2009||33 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||21233 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Financial Intermediation, Volume 18, Issue 4, October 2009, Pages 599–631
We analyze financial contracting in start-ups backed by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs). CVCs' strategic goals can economically hurt or benefit the start-ups, depending on product market relationships between start-ups and CVC parents. Empirically, start-ups receive funding from both complementary and competitive CVC parents. However, start-up insiders commonly limit the influence of competitive CVCs, awarding them lower board power, while retaining higher board representation for themselves. Second, lead CVCs receive lower board representation, indicating heightened concerns about their greater influence in start-ups' early stages. Finally, start-ups extract higher valuations from competitive CVCs, reflecting greater moral hazard problems. Overall, CVC strategic objectives affect their early inclusion in VC syndicates, their control rights and share pricing.