تعهد به کالای اجتماعی و معاملات داخلی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|48879||2014||27 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||21559 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Accounting and Economics, Volume 57, Issues 2–3, April–May 2014, Pages 149–175
A firm׳s investment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) builds a positive image of caring for social good and imposes additional costs on executives׳ informed trading, which is widely perceived self-serving. We thus expect executives of CSR-conscious firms to be more likely to refrain from informed trading. We find that executives of CSR-conscious firms profit significantly less from insider trades and are less likely to trade prior to future news than executives of non-CSR-conscious firms. The negative association between CSR and insider trading profits is more pronounced when executives׳ personal interests are more aligned with the interests of the firm.