نهادهای پولی، نتایج اشتغال و رقابت ناقص
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|48972||2011||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||10221 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume 22, Issue 2, August 2011, Pages 131–148
This paper explores the employment effects of strategic interactions between firms, trade unions and monetary institutions in the context of an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model with right-to-manage bargaining. The results suggest that the employment effect of joining a monetary union is conditional upon the degree of monetary accommodation of the union-wide central bank, the degree of product market competition, and the relative bargaining power in wage-setting. In addition, the employment effect of a change in the degree of monetary accommodation of the domestic or the union-wide central bank is conditional upon the degree of product market competition and the distribution of bargaining power.