دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 48994
عنوان فارسی مقاله

قراردادهای ناقص موثر و نقاط عطف در مشارکت بازار دور R & D

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
48994 2012 12 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
Effective incomplete contracts and milestones in market-distant R&D collaboration
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Research Policy, Volume 41, Issue 2, March 2012, Pages 346–357

کلمات کلیدی
R & D همکاری؛ خطر اخلاقی؛ قراردادهای ناقص؛ انگیزه؛ مالکیت ثبت اختراع، پرداخت وابسته به نقطه عطف
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله قراردادهای ناقص موثر و نقاط عطف در مشارکت بازار دور R & D

چکیده انگلیسی

R&D outsourcing is often conducted during the early, market-distant stages of the innovation process. However, the main obstacle to this potentially efficient interfirm specialization is the high danger of moral hazard. Most organizational mechanisms fail to control that type of opportunism because of information asymmetries, even ex post. In the theory of incomplete contracts, this problem is mitigated by assigning the control rights to the supplier. To date, empirical studies have mainly investigated the interfirm distribution of the control rights. However, we do not know yet which concrete control right is crucial with regard to supplier opportunism, which is the decisive dependent variable. Our study addresses this research gap. For the first time, we extend the empirical focus from biotechnology and pharmaceutical firm alliances to a cross-industry sample of 113 collaboration cases. The results show the effectiveness of contracts that ex ante assign patent ownership rights to the supplier. The findings are also relevant for management practice because the majority of practitioners do not use this contract type yet, although there is no sign of an effective alternative.

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