تجارت داخلی, افشای عمومی و رقابت ناقص
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|49036||2012||24 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Review of Economics & Finance, Volume 24, October 2012, Pages 200–223
We present a multi-period trading model in the style of Kyle's (1985) inside trading model, by assuming that there are at least two insiders in the market with long-lived private information, under the requirement that each insider publicly disclose his stock trades after the fact. The influences of “public disclosure” and “competition among insiders” on the trading behaviors of insiders and the market are studied. Moreover, we give the exact speed of the revelation of the private information, and show that all information is revealed immediately and the market depth goes to infinity immediately as trading happens infinitely frequently.