دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 49045
عنوان فارسی مقاله

رقابت ناقص، ریسک و مقررات در بانکداری

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
49045 2000 34 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : European Economic Review, Volume 44, Issue 1, January 2000, Pages 1–34

کلمات کلیدی
قدرت بازار - هزینه اجتماعی شکست - ریسک پذیری - با مسئولیت محدود - حفاظت از سرمایه گذار - مقررات رای دادن - محدودیت دارایی
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله رقابت ناقص، ریسک و مقررات در بانکداری

چکیده انگلیسی

We asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability. We study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives, and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime. Specifically, when competition is intense and the social failure costs high, deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk-based insurance. If insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure. We find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat-premium deposit insurance deposit regulation (rate regulation or deposit limits) and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare. In an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk-based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare.

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