دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 49060
عنوان فارسی مقاله

اجرای قانون رقابت ناقص

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
49060 2006 31 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
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عنوان انگلیسی
Imperfect competition law enforcement ☆
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 24, Issue 6, November 2006, Pages 1267–1297

کلمات کلیدی
ضد تراست - سیاست رقابت - اجرای قانون رقابت - خطاهای نوع اول و نوع دوم - تبانی - سوء استفاده از تسلط
پیش نمایش مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی

Competition policy is a subject of often heated debate. Competition authorities, seeking to prevent or battle anticompetitive acts in complex cases to the best of their abilities, regularly find themselves advised by rival economic theories and disputed empirical analyses. As a consequence, there is a real possibility that they may occasionally err, missing true violations of competition law or finding firms liable that actually had no other intentions than good competition. In this paper, possible consequences of such imperfect competition law enforcement on firm strategies are considered. In a simple model of collusion, it is found that the incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types of enforcement errors: Type II errors decrease expected fines, while Type I errors encourage industries to collude precautionary when they face the risk of a false conviction. Hence, fallible antitrust enforcement may stifle genuine competition, thus stimulating the very behavior competition policy is meant to deter. When enforcement errors are non-negligible, competition authorities run the risk of being over-zealous, in the sense that welfare is best served by an authority that is selective and conscientious in its targeting of alleged anticompetitive acts.

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