تمایل به برنده شدن : اثرات برانگیختگی رقابتی در انگیزش و رفتار
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|4910||2010||8 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||7130 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Volume 111, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 139–146
The paper theoretically elaborates and empirically investigates the “competitive arousal” model of decision making, which argues that elements of the strategic environment (e.g., head-to-head rivalry and time pressure) can fuel competitive motivations and behavior. Study 1 measures real-time motivations of online auction bidders and finds that the “desire to win” (even when winning is costly and will provide no strategic upside) is heightened when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 2 is a field experiment which alters the text of email alerts sent to bidders who have been outbid; the text makes competitive (vs. non-competitive) motivations salient. Making the desire to win salient triggers additional bidding, but only when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 3, a laboratory study, demonstrates that the desire to win mediates the effect of rivalry and time pressure on over-bidding
Competitive behavior, defined as the pursuit of assets perceived to be scarce and contested, is ubiquitous (cf., Deutsch, 1949). In domains as varied as business, politics, sports, and nature, individuals and other entities (e.g., firms) compete for limited resources, status, and survival (Hirshleifer, 1978). Competitive behavior is not only seen as a means by which an individual entity can benefit: in the market setting, it is also a primary mechanism for creating value (Smith, 1776). Despite these advantages, the motivation to compete can sometimes have pernicious effects, e.g., the adoption of unethical strategies like sabotage (Hoffman et al., 1954, Mui, 1995 and Münster, 2007). Paradoxically, competitive motivations may lead to strategies that harm not only one’s adversary, but also oneself (Garcia et al., 2006, Güth et al., 1982 and Ku et al., 2005). Ku et al. (2005), for example, found that the desire to beat rival bidders can lead auction participants to pay more than an item is worth to them (cf., Cox, Smith, & Walker, 1992). Likewise, Malhotra, Ku, and Murnighan (2008) suggest that the desire to “win” can lead disputants to pursue costly litigation even when a less antagonistic strategy would lead to better outcomes. This paper investigates when and why potentially self-damaging competitive motivations and behaviors will emerge.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The current investigation finds that elements of the competitive environment can heighten the desire to win, and that this motivation has an impact on competitive behaviors. Study 1 demonstrates that when rivalry and time pressure coincide, “winning” becomes a more powerful motivator. Study 2 demonstrates that triggering a desire to win can have powerful effects on behavior, especially when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 3 considers alternative explanations for the effect of rivalry and time pressure on competitive behavior and finds that the effect is mediated by the desire to win. The context of Studies 1 and 2 (actual auctions) and the large effect-size in Study 2 are both noteworthy. The current research extends the literature on competitive motivation and behavior in a number of ways. First, by distinguishing between “competitive motivation” and the “desire to win”, I clarify the relationship between competitive behaviors, competitive motivation, and the relatively less common but potentially costly preference for maximizing relative payoffs. Second, while it has long been understood that competitor and disputant motivations can transform in the heat of battle—away from a desire to obtain scarce and contested assets, and towards beating the perceived rival (Rubin et al., 1994)—and while this possibility has been discussed in negotiation and dispute resolution courses for years (cf., Murnighan, 2002), the current investigation provides a precise theoretical and empirical account for this transition. In doing so, the paper builds on Ku et al.’s (2005) model empirically as well as theoretically, by elaborating and testing the mechanisms underlying competitive arousal. Finally, while previous research (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Loewenstein et al., 1989 and Messick and Sentis, 1985) has demonstrated that competitive motivations are influenced by relational and structural factors, the current results suggest that such motivations can also be heightened endogenously, as the competition itself unfolds (e.g., as time starts to run out, or the number of adversaries whittles down to one). The fact that the “natural” progression of a competition or a conflict influences the degree to which parties exhibit a desire to win is of theoretical and practical significance. One implication is that a better understanding of competitive behavior may require that we focus less on distinguishing among individuals who are competitive vs. cooperative “types” (De Dreu and Boles, 1998 and Messick and McClintock, 1968), and more so on investigating the conditions under which different motivations are likely to emerge, or become salient. Prior work has been largely limited to studying exogenous triggers of the desire to win, as when decision frames (e.g., De Dreu & McCusker, 1997) or implicit primes (e.g., Kay and Ross, 2003 and Kay et al., 2004) are experimentally manipulated, or when individuals are asked to imagine a positive or negative prior relationship with the other party (e.g., Loewenstein et al., 1989). Greater emphasis on endogenous triggers of competitive motivations and behaviors seems warranted. Hybrid approaches may be even more fruitful: certain types of individuals and relationships may be more susceptible to competitive arousal (cf., Creyer and Kozup, 2003 and Garcia and Tor, 2009). More generally, the current results speak to the growing literature on the role of affect in decision making (Peters, Vastfjall, Garling, & Solvic, 2006). For example, prior research documents inconsistencies between decisions that are predicted ex ante and those that are actually made in competitive contexts ( Ku, 2008 and O’Connor et al., 2002). One explanation for the inconsistency between predicted and actual decisions is that visceral reactions to environmental stimuli at the moment of decision are powerful motivators of behavior, but are difficult to anticipate in advance ( Loewenstein, 1996, Read and van Leeuwen, 1998 and Wilson and Gilbert, 2005). The current results point to a more fundamental problem with emotional decision making, at least in the context of competitive interaction: the factors that trigger emotional and visceral reactions may not emerge (i.e., be “visible”) until after the competition unfolds. This creates an additional problem for decision makers to tackle: predict the emergence of factors that may trigger visceral reactions and predict affective response to such factors. Surprisingly, while there is some research on the role of visceral, “heat of the moment” reactions (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006) in consumer choice and other individual decision-making contexts, extremely little attention has been focused on the antecedents and consequences of visceral reactions in competitive contexts (Delgado et al., 2008 and Ku et al., 2005). Given the fact that social and economic interactions are rife with competitive motivations and behavior, and considering the size of the effects documented in this investigation, this seems to be a conspicuous omission in the literature on affective decision making. The current investigation also extends research on auction behavior. The winner’s curse and the escalation of commitment, both of which predict over-bidding in auctions, have been studied for over three decades (Capen et al., 1971 and Staw, 1976). In contrast, research on competitive arousal is still in its early stages (Ku et al., 2005 and van den Bos et al., 2008). The different mechanisms underlying these alternative models are worth noting. The mechanism underlying the winner’s curse is incomplete information and a tendency to ignore the perspectives and decisions of other parties (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983, Crawford and Iriberri, 2007 and Thaler, 1988). The mechanism underlying the escalation of commitment involves cognitive and motivational biases, in particular, the inability to ignore sunk costs and the motivation to self-justify prior decisions (Heath, 1995 and Staw and Ross, 1978). In contrast, the mechanism underlying competitive arousal is emotional/visceral and motivational (Ku et al., 2005 and Loewenstein, 1996). It is hoped that the elaboration of the competitive arousal model in this paper will serve as in impetus for more research on the visceral component of bidder behavior. On a more practical level, the current results suggest the need for greater vigilance among individuals who are engaged in competition. If perceived rivalry and increasing time pressure are “risk factors” associated with a heightened desire to win “at any cost” it may be wise for individuals to anticipate and mitigate these risks. For example, individuals may set aside more time for important negotiations, especially in dispute contexts, to make competitive arousal less likely. Likewise, the effects of rivalry may be dealt with by limiting the decision authority of (or by sidelining) those who feel the rivalry most intensely (Malhotra et al., 2008). Further research on these issues is necessary and would be fruitful. Research on competitive arousal and on the emergence of motivations and behaviors aimed at “winning” is in its early stages, but given how prevalent rivalry and time pressure are in business and social contexts, the implications of this work may be considerable.