انگیزه های سرمایه گذاری در بازار برق کره ای
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|49190||2007||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||4641 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 35, Issue 11, November 2007, Pages 5819–5828
This paper develops a model-based analysis of the effects of various capacity incentive systems on new investment in the Korean electricity market. The restructuring process in Korea allocated power generation to six firms, competing within a wholesale market, albeit strictly on a cost basis. Because of this cost-based pool, capacity payments were also introduced to encourage new investment. However, it is an open question whether the current fixed capacity payment scheme is enough to secure resource adequacy, and consideration is being given to alternative mechanisms such as the use of LOLP. Using a detailed market simulation model, based on system dynamics, we compare these approaches in terms of how they may influence the investors’ decisions and thereby determine the system reserve margin. The simulation results suggest that there may be serious problems in staying with the current fixed capacity payments in order to achieve resource adequacy. In contrast, an LOLP-based capacity mechanism may, in the longer term, increase the reserve margin compared with a fixed capacity payment. More generally, this paper indicates how crucial the effective modeling of the investment behavior of the independent power producers is for adequate policy support, even if they only constitute a fringe in a substantially centrally influenced market.