پتانسیل برای سلب مالکیت از طریق قرارداد جوینت ونچر
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|49344||2007||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8054 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Review of Financial Economics, Volume 16, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 111–126
We examine the potential expropriation of a firm's intellectual capital that results from joint venture agreements when a firm's joint venture partner becomes the target of an acquisition attempt. We find that: (1) non-targeted joint venture partners often suffer losses in value upon the announcement of the acquisition; (2) the magnitude of the loss increases with the R&D intensity of the non-targeted joint venture partner; and (3) average bidder returns are less negative for acquirers if the affected joint venture partners report R&D spending and are in the same line of business as the acquirer. Our estimate of the average loss is $843 million per firm, roughly 3% of the non-targeted firm's pre-announcement equity value. Our evidence suggests a previously unrecognized merger motive in that joint ventures expose a firm's intellectual capital to the risk of expropriation.