محدودیت صادرات در یک مدل از تجارت با انباشت سرمایه
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|49701||2007||21 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8948 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 31, Issue 12, December 2007, Pages 3822–3842
This paper examines the impact of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in an international duopoly modeled as a differential game. With a Ramsey capital accumulation dynamics, the game admits multiple steady states, and a VER cannot be ‘voluntarily’ employed by the foreign firm in case of Cournot behavior in demand substitutes. Hence, the dynamic framework confirms the results of the VERs literature with static interaction in output levels. In the case of price behavior, the adoption of an export restraint may increase the profits of both firms if products are substitutes and the steady state is ‘market-driven’. However, contrary to the acquired wisdom based upon the static approach, the dynamic analysis also admits an equilibrium outcome, identified by the Ramsey golden rule, where the incentive to adopt a VER is ruled out, irrespective of whether firms are quantity- or price-setters.