قوانین قیمت گذاری انتقالی و رقابت مالیات بر شرکت ها
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|49825||1996||22 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Public Economics, Volume 60, Issue 3, June 1996, Pages 401–422
A multinational parent sells a non-marketed commodity to a foreign subsidiary that uses the product as an input to produce a product it then sells. The subsidiary is controlled by a local managing partner whose compensation consists of a lump-sum payment plus a share of the subsidiary's profit. The parent chooses an optimal transfer price taking into account incentives for the subsidiary's managing partner and taxes. Home and host governments impose corporate income taxes on the parent and subsidiary's respective profits subject to a transfer pricing rule (e.g. cost plus price method or comparable profit method). A Nash equilibrium is derived for effective tax rates chosen by home and host governments. We then examine harmonization and suggest that tax rates would be reduced.