حمایت مالی از رانتجویی: حفاظت ضددامپینگ و متمم بایرد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50216||2006||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6655 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of International Economics, Volume 70, Issue 2, December 2006, Pages 490–502
This paper argues that a recent U.S. law, which distributes the tariff revenue resulting from successful antidumping petitions to firms that supported the petitions, increases the amount of antidumping protection requested by U.S. firms in two ways. First, by increasing the total benefits accruing to industries filing successful petitions, the law subsidizes rent-seeking. Second, by awarding these subsidies only to those firms that actively support the petition, it mitigates the free rider problem traditionally associated with collective actions. Empirical results provide strong evidence that industries have filed more antidumping petitions under the new law. Moreover, the average proportion of firms in the industry filing these petitions increased under the law, suggesting that the law at least partially alleviates free riding incentives.