ضد دامپینگ، سیگنالینگ و ارزان بحث
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50220||2008||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6784 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of International Economics, Volume 75, Issue 2, July 2008, Pages 373–382
In the United States, there is evidence that domestic non-filing firms do not always support dumping/countervailing duty investigations. Absent other factors, domestic firms have an unambiguous incentive to support petitions filed by other domestic producers. We argue that in cases where the non-complainant firm is not a significant importer or exporter, the most plausible explanation is that non-support acts as a costly signal of private information. Extending the model to allow firms to engage in cheap talk, such signaling can take place even in the absence of an investigation. This result provides an explanation for the puzzling observation that fewer antidumping investigations are filed than one would expect.