کژ گزینی و شتاب دهنده مالی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50245||2006||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8441 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 53, Issue 6, September 2006, Pages 1117–1134
Many economists believe that credit market distortions create a financial accelerator which destabilizes the economy. This paper shows that when credit market distortions arise from adverse selection they sometimes stabilize the economy rather than destabilize it. The stabilizing forces are closely related to forces that cause overinvestment in static models. When investment projects are equity financed, or when contracts are written optimally, the distortions always stabilize the economy. Thus, stabilizing equilibria are a robust feature of the model. The empirical distinction between accelerator and stabilizer equilibria is subtle. Many empirical tests are unable to distinguish between accelerator and stabilizer equilibria.