کژ گزینی مقابل سیگنالینگ: شواهد از قیمت گذاری عرضه اولیه اوراق بهادار چینی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50259||2004||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economics and Business, Volume 56, Issue 1, January–February 2004, Pages 1–19
Because of the high economic uncertainty inherent in the privatization process, financial markets in China are characterized by large information asymmetry. Using data of 587 firm-commitment initial public offerings (IPOs) between January 1994 and December 1999, I investigate whether IPO underpricing is related to pre-IPO information asymmetry and whether and to what extent underpricing serves as a signal of firm quality. I find that: (1) Underpricing is correlated with proxies of ex ante uncertainty, including the size of offerings, insider ownership, disclosure practice, market conditions and allocation mechanism. (2) To some extent, underpricing can be explained in terms of a strategy for firms to signal their value to investors. However, the market-feedback hypothesis has more explanatory power than the signaling hypothesis. My empirical results are largely consistent with “winner’s curse” and signaling models.