تولید گروهی در بازارهای رقابتی کار با کژ گزینی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50265||2014||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||14152 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : European Economic Review, Volume 68, May 2014, Pages 181–198
Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team׳s performance and therefore on their colleagues׳ productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers have private information on their productivity. We find that in any competitive equilibrium there must be Pareto-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where under a particular condition on workers׳ indifference curves even arbitrarily small externalities guarantee equilibrium existence.