تجزیه و تحلیل تکاملی بازار بیمه با کژ گزینی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50273||2002||32 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||15227 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 40, Issue 2, August 2002, Pages 153–184
The equilibrium nonexistence problem in Rothschild and Stiglitz's insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting. Insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised: profitable competitors' contracts are imitated and loss-making contracts are withdrawn. Occasionally, a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts. We show that Rothschild and Stiglitz's candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long-run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently “similar” to those currently on the market.