حاکمیت شرکتی تحت اطلاعات نامتقارن: نظریه و شواهد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50323||2013||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11061 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Economic Modelling, Volume 33, July 2013, Pages 280–291
This paper discusses and explores three situations under asymmetric information. First, companies with a higher level of corporate governance provisions compensate the owner–manager with a higher managerial reward for information disclosed. Second, there are significant and positive relationships between information disclosed and corporate governance provisions, as well as between company value and corporate governance provisions. The higher proportion of a firm held by the largest owner(s) has negative impacts on information disclosed and shareholder rights as outside investors underestimate the companies' performance caused by insufficient effort of the owner–manager or by other factors. Third, audits improve moral hazard when outside investors are informed of bad company performance by underestimating the stock price.