دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 50390
عنوان فارسی مقاله

خطر اخلاقی، اطلاعات نامتقارن و توقیف IPO

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
50390 2010 13 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
Moral hazard, asymmetric information and IPO lockups
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 16, Issue 3, June 2010, Pages 320–332

کلمات کلیدی
عرضه اولیه عمومی - اطلاعات نامتقارن - خطر اخلاقی - توقیف IPO
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله خطر اخلاقی، اطلاعات نامتقارن و توقیف IPO

چکیده انگلیسی

Moral hazard and asymmetric information have both been proposed as the motive behind the use of IPO lockup provisions, with each receiving empirical support in the literature. Rather than consider them to be mutually exclusive motivations, we hypothesize that each is dominant for a different set of firms. We provide novel empirical support for the underwriter certification hypothesis then use this hypothesis to categorize the firms in our sample. Firms that are certified by a reputable underwriter see a reduction in the severity of asymmetric information relative to other firms and therefore will be more likely to see moral hazard as the friction that motivates the use of the lockup provision. For those firms that are unable to obtain high reputation underwriter certification it is relatively more likely that asymmetric information is the motivation for the use of the lockup provision. Based on this separation of firms we introduce and provide empirical support for a novel set of hypotheses concerning the lockup period.

خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.