کنترل حقوق صاحبان سهام و بقای سرمایه گذاری مشترک بین المللی : یک رویکرد اقتضائی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|5054||2005||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Business Research, Volume 58, Issue 6, June 2005, Pages 736–745
This study attends to equivocal results regarding the relationship between equity control and international joint venture (IJV) performance by proposing a transaction-cost-based contingency framework. We examined the moderating effects of asset specificity and uncertainty on the relationship between foreign parent equity control and IJV survival in an empirical setting of Japanese IJVs in 12 Asian countries in the 1985–1996 period. Our findings suggest that in the presence of high asset specificity, high levels of foreign equity control can lead to higher IJV survival rates. Furthermore, we find that social knowledge can serve as a substitute for equity control in IJVs and contribute to higher IJV survival rates.
Ownership position in international joint ventures (IJVs) is a critical issue (Luo et al., 2001). There is a mounting body of research on ownership and equity control that can be divided into two research streams. One stream looks at the initial conditions of IJV parent firms and the optimal level of equity control. The general findings in this stream support a transaction cost argument that higher levels of equity control are preferred when the appropriation risk of firm-specific assets in the IJV is high. Yet, the performance outcomes of these ownership strategy predictions have yet to be explored. The second stream on ownership and control has focused on the relationship between equity control and the performance of IJVs. However, there is no clear consensus on the relationship between equity control and IJV performance. Researchers have reported a positive relationship Killing, 1983 and Delios and Beamish, 2004, a negative relationship Beamish, 1984 and Lu, 2000 or no clear relationship at all Kogut, 1988 and Steensma and Lyles, 2000 between dominant foreign equity control and IJV performance. A fourth group has suggested a contingency approach for this relationship (Yan and Gray, 1994). Recently, research has taken the perspective of local partners to show that in emerging countries IJVs, equity control was more important for a foreign firm's satisfaction and performance assessment than for a local partner's (Luo et al., 2001). At best, these findings on the relationship between equity control and IJV performance remain equivocal. In this study, we attend to the equivocal results regarding the relationship between equity control and performance by combining these two IJV research streams. We investigate the linkages between the initial conditions for the IJVs, foreign equity control and the survival of IJVs using a transaction cost-based contingency framework. Particularly, at the formation of an IJV, foreign investors need to account for appropriability risks associated with transferring firm-specific assets as well as with the uncertainty linked to operating in an unfamiliar environment. These conditions may moderate the impact of equity control on performance (Hébert, 1994). Therefore, we contend that it is not the level of equity control itself, but the fit between the initial conditions for the IJV and the level of equity control, which influences the performance of IJVs. By adopting a contingency framework, we contribute to both research streams. For the ownership strategy stream, our study provides a direct test of the survival implications of the ownership levels based on the predictions of the transaction cost theory. For the equity control–IJV performance stream, we specify conditions under which different levels of equity control enhance IJV survival. Finally, with its focus on Asia-based IJVs, the study addresses the robustness and relevance of transaction cost economics outside the Western developed world.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This study extends our understanding of the nature of the equity control–IJV performance relationship in IJVs by applying a contingency framework approach to this relationship. We examined whether and how the equity control and IJV performance relationship was contingent on asset specificity and uncertainty factors, as associated with transaction cost theory. We found that the payoffs of control emerged more clearly in the presence of technology-intensive assets where increases in foreign equity control tended to stabilize IJVs. In contrast, when foreign parents had high industry experience, increases in foreign control added to termination risks. This study's analytical framework has important implications for both academics and managers. For the academic literature, our study advanced our understanding and awareness of the importance of contingency factors in the equity control and IJV performance relationship. Our findings exemplify the proposition by Geringer and Hébert (1989) that IJV performance is mainly a function of the fit between a parent firm's strategy and its control structures in its IJVs, rather than solely the direct outcome of the extent of control exercised. This type of contingency framework represents a useful stepping stone for future research in this area. To further our understanding of the relationship between equity control, and other aspects of an IJVs design, and IJV performance, we suggest it will similarly be necessary to look for other contingent factors derived from the application of other theoretical lenses. Turning to the managerial implications, for firms currently involved in, or contemplating involvement in, an IJV, this study highlights some of the key elements in the design of an efficient governance structure in IJVs. One such key element is the need to account for concerns about appropriability hazards, particularly in the presence of technological assets. There are two ways to address this concern. One is to rely on the appropriability regime of the host country to provide protection for the rents from technological assets. The other is to design and negotiate an appropriate governance structure to guard against such hazards. Consistent with recent studies by Oxley, 1997 and Oxley, 1999, our findings suggest that a higher control governance structure would be the most efficient way to combat the appropriability hazards in IJVs involving technological elements and in host countries with weak appropriability regimes. On the other hand, one also needs to consider the costs, such as the constraints on resources, the lack of flexibility and the lack of motivation of local partners to contribute to IJVs that are associated with high levels of equity control by foreign parents. Our results show that higher control structures may not be efficient when there are alternative ways to monitor the behavior of one's IJV partners. Specifically, firms can use social knowledge accumulated through experience as a substitute for equity control. In this way, firms can economize on the costs from high levels of equity ownership and achieve better performance.