بازی مدیریت نقدینگی معاملات روزانه
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50685||2003||22 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 109, Issue 2, April 2003, Pages 198–219
We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real-time gross settlement setting. The game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and it encompasses two well-known game theoretical paradigms: the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt. The former arises in a collateralized credit regime where banks have an incentive to postpone payments when daylight liquidity is costly, an outcome that is socially inefficient. The latter arises in a priced credit regime where the postponement of payments can be socially efficient. Banks are risk neutral, but we show that most of the results are unaffected by risk aversion.