معامله گران اختلالزا استراتژیک و فشار نقدینگی با یک قرارداد آتی تحویل فیزیکی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50859||2006||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||5262 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Review of Economics & Finance, Volume 15, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1–14
Do physically deliverable futures contracts induce liquidity pressure in the underlying spot market? The answer is believed to be no since the asset is delivered sometimes after the expiration of the contract so that the futures trader's payoff does not clearly depend on the price of the underlying stock at expiration. We construct a rational expectations equilibrium model in which a strategic uninformed trader induces liquidity pressure in the underlying spot market at the expiration of a physically deliverable futures contract. Liquidity pressure is the result of a pure informational advantage: if it is known that futures traders hedge their position in the spot market then a strategic trader with no information about the fundamental value of the underlying has an incentive to create noise in the futures market in order to gain information on the composition of the spot order flow at future auctions. We show that informed traders benefit from this form of strategic noise and that the efficiency of the prices remains unaffected.