در رقابت تعرفه دوگانه در یک انحصار دوگانه فروش محصول همگن
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50886||2015||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||14749 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 41, July 2015, Pages 30–41
We explore aspects of two-part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels. Competition in only one price component (the fee or the rate) may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms. Fixing one price component alters the nature of competition, indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation. Endogenous market segmentation emerges, with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm. When no price component can be negative, competition becomes softer, profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival.