انحصار دوگانه فروش بین منطقه مختلط
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50914||2009||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Regional Science and Urban Economics, Volume 39, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 233–242
We investigate an interregional mixed duopoly wherein a local public firm competes against a private firm. We employ a spatial model with price competition. The public firm is owned by the local government of the left half of the linear city called Region 1, and maximizes its welfare. We demonstrate that our two-stage game comprising location choice and price competition has two types of equilibria. In one equilibrium (E1), the local public firm locates in Region 1, and the private firm locates outside the region. In the other equilibrium (E2), both firms are located in Region 1. We find that although the two firms are closely located in E2, E2 payoff-dominates E1. Moreover, E2 is robust in the sense that the sequential choice of location adopts this equilibrium, regardless of whether the public firm is a leader or a follower.