مسابقه و قابلیت اطمینان: سیگنالینگ کیفیت در یک انحصار دوگانه فروش زمانی که اطلاعات خصوصی جهانی وجود دارد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|50919||2007||27 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 58, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 94–120
We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety. If horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known. Thus, while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality, duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition. Finally, average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low-quality firms.