دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 51061
عنوان فارسی مقاله

استکلبرگ در آزمایشگاه: اثر تصمیم گیری گروهی و "آرام شدن" دوره

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
51061 2012 14 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
Stackelberg in the lab: The effect of group decision making and “Cooling-off” periods
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 33, Issue 6, December 2012, Pages 1070–1083

کلمات کلیدی
استکلبرگ ؛ تصمیم گیری گروهی؛ دوره خنک کننده خاموش
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله استکلبرگ در آزمایشگاه: اثر تصمیم گیری گروهی و "آرام شدن" دوره

چکیده انگلیسی

The Stackelberg duopoly is a fundamental model of sequential output competition. The equilibrium outcome of the model results in a first-mover advantage where the first-moving firm produces more output, and earns larger profits, relative to the second-moving firm. Huck et al., 2001 and Huck and Wallace, 2002 test the Stackelberg duopoly in a lab setting and find that behavior is largely inconsistent with the equilibrium predictions of the model. We hypothesize that this inconsistency is a result of differences between the decision making environment implemented in the lab and firm environments in the field. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether group decision making and a decision “cooling-off” period lead to more profit maximizing Stackelberg behavior in the lab. Specifically, we re-test the Stackelberg duopoly in the lab while implementing (i) two-person decision making groups, and (ii) a 10-min cooling-off period for second movers. In line with the previous studies, we find that second-mover response behavior is largely inconsistent with profit maximization. Furthermore, the implementation of groups and a cooling-off period has little effect on second-mover behavior. However, we find that group first-movers choose significantly lower output levels than individuals. While further from the equilibrium prediction, we show that these lower output choices by groups are more in-line with profit maximizing behavior, conditional on the non-profit maximizing response behavior of second-movers.

خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.