یکپارچگی اقتصادی و فساد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|51316||2004||22 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 22, Issue 10, December 2004, Pages 1463–1484
We study the link between corruption and economic integration. Integration is modeled by a common regulation for public procurement. We show that integration resolves a term of trade driven prisoner's dilemma and will always take place in the absence of corruption. Corruption may destroy the incentives for integration. If the propensities to corruption are too different, the more honest country, which benefits less from integration, will not be willing to join the union. This difference in corruption propensities can be offset by a difference in efficiency. We also show that integration has the positive effect of reducing corruption.