انضباط سپرده گذار و تغییر استراتژی برای تنظیم موسسات صرفه جویی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|5150||2002||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 63, Issue 2, February 2002, Pages 263–274
This paper examines the role of uninsured deposits as a source of thrift funding from 1984 to 1994, and tests whether uninsured depositors have adjusted their holdings at thrifts in response to market forces, such as indications of impending institutional failure. It also examines how the reactions have changed over time as new legislation has been implemented. The study finds that failed institutions exhibit declining proportions of uninsured deposits-to-total-deposits prior to failure and that failing institutions attract fewer deposits from uninsured depositors prior to failure than do solvent institutions. Though there are some differences between the periods, the empirical results indicate that uninsured deposits will be governed by market discipline and that reducing the insurance limits on deposits will increase market discipline on thrifts
Perverse incentives created by deposit insurance have contributed significantly to the failure of large numbers of banks and thrifts in the 1980s and early 1990s and led to a reexamination of deposit insurance. Holders of uninsured deposits have more to lose from failure of depository institutions than do insured depositors, and would be more likely to respond to impending failure. The insured depositor may be concerned about maintaining a valuable banking relationship. Impending failure may lead to shifting of insured deposits to strengthen an alternative banking relationship as a precaution against closure. This paper tests three hypotheses about the behavior of uninsured deposits in response to impending failure, changes in the financial health of thrifts, and changing thrift regulations. The empirical results indicate that the uninsured deposit component of thrift funding is governed by market discipline and is affected by changing regulations. Large and positive duration gaps, in the face of increasing interest rates, adversely affected the institutions beginning in the mid-1960s. The federal regulators attempted many patchwork solutions directed at reducing interest rate risk and simulating solvency at troubled thrifts as outlined in the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. The federal government failed to come to grips with the problems of the 1980s and followed a policy of forbearance partly due to the inability of the Federal Saving Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insurance fund to cover the losses of the member thrifts. This study begins with the year 1984; this is the first year that thrifts reported information on uninsured deposits and submitted quarterly reports, rather than semi-annual reports. The study captures five years (1984–1988) when “zombie” thrifts were operating in a deregulated environment. In 1989 the insolvency of the FSLIC was finally recognized and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) dissolved the FSLIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Barth's (1991) Chapter 4 provides a good discussion of FIRREA. Supervisory authority was transferred to the new Office of Thrift Supervision in the Treasury Department and a new insurance fund (Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF)) was placed under the auspices of the FDIC. Insolvent thrifts were transferred to the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a new agency overseen by the chairman of the FDIC and provided with additional funding to resolve the crisis. FIRREA provided asset restrictions on both federal and state chartered thrifts (limitations on commercial real estate lending and the Qualified Thrift Lender Test), increased capital requirements, and limited the acceptance of brokered deposits to adequately capitalized thrifts. Enforcement powers by regulators were increased. The procedures for removing deposit insurance or appointing a receiver or conservator were expedited. Thus there are reasons to believe that the increased regulatory discipline, after the passage of FIRREA, may encourage additional uninsured deposits and/or may be a substitute for depositors’ reactions to the risk-taking activities of thrifts. Our period of study covers the five-year period, 1990 through 1994, to evaluate the effects of depositor discipline in the regulatory environment overseen by SAIF. The FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA), passed in late 1991, increased both regulatory and depositor discipline. FDICIA introduced prompt corrective action, limited the too-big-to-fail doctrine for big banks, and imposed stronger constraints on depository institutions’ acceptance of brokered deposits (following FDICIA, adequately capitalized institutions must receive approval before accepting brokered deposits). It also introduced risk-based deposit insurance premiums. This study evaluates whether the uninsured deposit component of the balance sheet behaved differently before and after these legislative changes. Many of these changes are designed to increase regulatory discipline that could serve as a substitute for depositor discipline. However, some changes have the potential to increase the potential losses of depositors in the occurrence of failure and hence intensify depositor discipline. The influence of changing regulations on changes in the behavior of uninsured deposits after FIRREA and FDICIA affects the debate on the desirability of reforming deposit insurance by reducing insurance coverage to increase market discipline. The results confirm previous findings that market discipline does exist with respect to uninsured deposits. Furthermore, though there are differences in the behavior across periods, uninsured deposits still exhibit the strong tendency to decline in the face of impending failure. Though currently the deposit insurance funds in the United States are in good financial shape and few institutions have failed in recent years, this issue is still very relevant. In a number of other countries, crises have affected the banking systems and placed numerous banks in precarious circumstances, making the issue of depositor discipline highly relevant. Section 2 highlights the role of deposit insurance and reviews the relevant literature. Proposals for reform are mentioned. Section 3 introduces the primary hypotheses tested and the data used to examine uninsured deposits in the context of the balance sheet with a focus on the discipline of institutions. Section 4 examines the past behavior of uninsured deposits at thrifts by employing two sets of empirical tests. The first set of tests examines trends in uninsured deposits-to-total-deposits prior to failure. The second compares the proportion of uninsured deposits-to-total-deposits in failing thrifts to solvent thrifts. The final section presents policy implications and conclusions.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The thrift industry experienced considerable turmoil during the 1980s and early 1990s. The regulatory system has been changed dramatically. Many believe that much of the problem is due to the perverse effect of nearly full deposit insurance on the behavior of depositors and industry participants. One of the major proposals for reform calls for a reduction in the coverage of deposit insurance. This discussion may be relevant also for the banking systems of other countries. This paper provides useful input into the debate about deposit insurance coverage by determining that the uninsured depositors discipline thrift risk-taking. The study finds that failed institutions exhibit declining proportions of uninsured deposits-to-total-deposits prior to failure, that failing institutions on average have a lower proportion of uninsured deposits-to-total-deposits prior to failure than do solvent institutions, and that the regulations included in FIRREA and FDICIA increased the proportion of uninsured deposits-to-total assets. These empirical results indicate that uninsured depositors have incentives to monitor and discipline S&L risk exposure so that reducing the insurance limits on deposits will increase market discipline on thrifts. The study also finds that the changes in regulation have affected the behavior of uninsured deposits. Holdings of uninsured deposits were relatively higher in the SAIF period than in the FSLIC period. Further investigation of the effects of changes in the financial and regulatory environments of thrifts have potential to provide further insights concerning the behavior of depositors.