شیوه های حاکمیت شرکتی و شدت تحقیق و توسعه شرکت ها: شواهدی از کشورهای اروپایی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|51883||2015||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||9040 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research Policy, Volume 44, Issue 2, March 2015, Pages 533–543
This paper empirically investigates whether corporate governance practices implemented to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests affect the resources firms devote to R&D. Two databases – one on governance ratings and one on R&D investment – are merged to obtain a multi-country, multi-sector sample of 177 European companies involved in R&D activities. The results suggest that limitations of anti-takeover devices and voting rights restrictions, a financial performance-based remuneration system for managers and a higher shareholders’ consensus at the annual general assembly are all negatively correlated with R&D intensity. In other words, governance practices that are designed to respond to the short-term expectations of financial markets might prove to be detrimental to long-term R&D investments.