تاثیر حاکمیت شرکتی بر نتایج مالی تنوع جهانی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|51970||2013||26 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11897 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The International Journal of Accounting, Volume 48, Issue 3, September 2013, Pages 364–389
The tenets of agency theory suggest that: 1) managers may pursue investment strategies that are at odds with shareholder value, and 2) effective governance mechanisms can improve the quality of managerial decision-making and enhance the outcomes of corporate investment. Accordingly, using an agency theory lens, we hypothesize that the financial outcomes of global diversification are contingent on the quality of the multinational firm’s corporate governance: high (poor) quality corporate governance is associated with positive (negative) financial consequences attributable to global diversification. Using a sample of 5985 firm-year observations over the period 2002 through 2006, we find support for our hypothesis. The results are robust to using three different measures of global diversification, three different measures of financial outcomes (one accounting-based and two market-based measures), and two econometric methods to control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision.