سرمایه مالیات بر درآمد، توزیع ثروت و استقراض محدودیت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|52015||2001||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||5920 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Public Economics, Volume 79, Issue 1, January 2001, Pages 55–69
The theorem of zero taxation of capital income is reexamined and is shown to hinge critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter-temporal allocation of resources. The theorem does not hold when borrowing constraints prevent individuals from insuring against idiosyncratic shocks and have a precautionary motive for savings. Structural assumptions are made such that with no taxation, aggregate savings are socially ‘excessive’ in the long-run, i.e. the rate of return is smaller than the discount rate. Sufficient conditions for a Pareto efficient taxation or subsidization of capital in the long-run depend on the correlation between individuals’ consumption and savings. A subsidy may be efficient when individuals’ incomes follow a predictable pattern of life-cycles with no negative bequest.