دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 52061
عنوان فارسی مقاله

رفتار استراتژیک در کسب و افشای اطلاعات خصوصی پرهزینه

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
52061 2015 16 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
Strategic behavior in acquiring and revealing costly private information
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : International Review of Economics & Finance, Volume 39, September 2015, Pages 133–148

کلمات کلیدی
کسب اطلاعات پرهزینه - پاداش و مجازات نامتقارن - صداقت اطلاعات نشان داده شده
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله رفتار استراتژیک در کسب و افشای اطلاعات خصوصی پرهزینه

چکیده انگلیسی

When an agent has the opportunity to access public information, whether or not to acquire costly private information is a strategic decision. In this case, to study the informativeness of the revealed information, it is essential to consider the processes of both information acquisition and revelation together. Using a model in which two agents sequentially forecast the true state of a forthcoming period, this paper studies an agent's strategic behavior in acquiring and revealing costly private information in the presence of the payoff externality due to their competition. If the penalty for an incorrect forecast is greater than the reward for being right, the forecast cannot be informative because there is no investment in private information. Otherwise, costly private information is acquired as long as the information quality is moderate. Hence, the payoff structure under which the reward is greater than the penalty is a necessary condition for the investment in costly private information. Moreover, the acquired information is always revealed truthfully without herding or anti-herding. That is, the introduction of endogenous costly information raises the issue of “free-riding” rather than the issue of “herding or anti-herding”.

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