مدل سازی رفتار استراتژیک چند سرویسه شبکه های چندپخشی پوشش کامل بر اساس طراحی مکانیزم بازارهای حراج
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|52076||2011||17 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||16903 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, Volume 71, Issue 8, August 2011, Pages 1125–1141
Since the users of overlay multicast networks belong to different administrative domains, they are selfish in nature; resulting in degradation of performance. That is why strategic behavior modeling is a hot topic in the area of the overlay multicast networks. Mechanism design is the most versatile tool for strategic behavior modeling in microeconomics. In this paper, we model the strategic behavior of the selfish peers by leveraging the rich theory of mechanism design using the concept of economic auctions. By considering the bandwidth of services as the commodity, we design a revenue-maximizing auction mechanism. The sellers are either the origin servers or the peers who forward the digital multimedia content to their downstream peers. For each seller, the corresponding downstream peers play the role of buyers who are referred to as bidders. Each bidder submits a sealed bid to the corresponding seller. The highest bidder wins and pays its bid for the service. Also, we derive analytical closed-form expressions for upper bounds relevant to the performance metrics. The experimental validation proves the scalability and the efficiency of the proposed mechanism.