دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 5656
عنوان فارسی مقاله

تاثیر موج جدیدی از مقررات مالی برای بازارهای انرژی اروپا

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
5656 2012 10 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید 8710 کلمه
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
The impact of the new wave of financial regulation for European energy markets
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 47, August 2012, Pages 468–477

کلمات کلیدی
- قوانین مالی - مقررات - اتحادیه اروپا
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پیش نمایش مقاله تاثیر موج جدیدی از مقررات مالی برای بازارهای انرژی اروپا

چکیده انگلیسی

As the financial and physical markets for energy have increasingly become intertwined, energy trade is also covered by financial legislation. The European Commission wishes to strengthen this financial regulation of energy trade. It has put forward a set of regulatory proposals aimed at stabilizing financial markets and limiting volatility of energy prices. The most noteworthy are EMIR, MAD, REMIT and the revised MiFID. Key elements are transparency, new trading venues, central clearing obligations and mandatory transaction reporting. This article evaluates the likely outcomes for energy markets, given the new incentives for market parties. It argues that although there is no ground to exempt particular energy market participants such as energy companies from financial legislation, increased regulation will not necessarily bring about the effects the Commission desires. The causal link between derivatives trading and volatility of energy prices is not known precisely and many of the economic effects of the proposed legislation are theoretically and empirically ambiguous. Moreover, potentially conflicting instruments and objectives risk policy inconsistency.

مقدمه انگلیسی

The volatility of energy prices in recent years has generated political pressure to put these price movements under control. Simultaneously, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Commission has set itself an ambitious regulatory reform agenda for the financial markets. This includes both a strengthening of existing financial regulation, as well as several new proposals. As the financial and physical markets have become intertwined – EU legislation defines many energy contracts as ‘financial instruments’ – regulation in financial markets will affect energy markets too. Recognizing this interdependence of financial and energy markets, the proposed set of financial legislation has two objectives. First, it wishes to reduce systemic risk in financial markets and avert some of the domino effects that unfolded in the recent crisis. Second, as this financial legislation also covers trade in commodity derivatives, it seeks to curb volatility of energy prices. The proposed regulatory package contains a number of requirements for market participants. These range from transaction reporting obligations and enhanced transparency to compulsory central clearing. Such requirements pose new incentives for market parties in their trading activities. In turn, the way they react to these incentives affects market outcomes. Because this financial legislation will cover energy trade as well, it is likely to have significant consequences for energy markets. This article addresses the question whether, in light of the potential implications for energy markets, the proposed changes to financial legislation will have the effects the European Commission desires. This question derives its relevance from three aspects. First, the academic literature has generally focussed on the appropriate regulatory design for specific markets, for instance in relation to the liberalization of European energy markets or the stability of financial markets. As also noted by Diaz-Rainey et al. (2011), little research has been done regarding cross-market effects of financial regulation on energy markets. Now that the line between the traditional financial and energy markets has become blurred, the link between the two deserves more attention. Second, it may prove useful not just to point out which aspects of energy trading may come under financial regulation, but to take the analysis one step further and examine how participants in the energy markets are likely to react to the incentives this new legislation offers them. The success of regulation hinges on how market participants adapt their behaviour to it, not just the substance of the legislation itself. Third, to the extent that these proposals are motivated by electoral calls for a strong response to financial instability and energy price volatility, whether or not they will actually bring this about may have political ramifications as well. Methodologically, the research question will be addressed as follows. As a first step, the legislative proposals, regulations and directives in question will be analysed to sketch the proposed legal framework and distil the most relevant aspects for energy trading parties. Second, the economic literature is drawn upon to assess the theoretical and empirical consequences for market conditions of these regulatory changes. As the aim of the article is to invoke a number of potential market effects to be evaluated empirically in later work, no particular model or theoretical framework is employed at this point. Although in this article the focus will be on energy, with the utilities serving the retail markets for electricity and natural gas as the main concern, the intertwining of the physical and financial markets has also involved other types of commodities too.2 The new financial legislation aims to step up regulation of trading in commodity derivatives as a whole. Some of the conclusions therefore also apply to the markets for other commodities than energy. This article will proceed as follows. Section two will illustrate the intertwinement of physical and financial markets and the rationale to step up regulation. The third section will outline the recent wave of (financial) legislation that would apply to energy markets. Section four will point out how key elements in this legislation will affect market participants and how their reactions could in turn impact market outcomes. The subsequent section will assess whether these outcomes are in line with the objectives set out by the Commission. In other words, is the proposed regulatory package the appropriate instrument to achieve the Commission's goals? A final section concludes.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

The financial and physical energy markets have become intertwined. This article has described the vast set of financial legislation that, if pushed through, would have significant consequences for European energy markets. The European Commission seeks to stabilize both financial markets and energy prices by regulating the trade in financial instruments, including energy derivatives. Key elements in this regulatory package are transparency, the emergence of new trading platforms, central clearing of OTC derivatives and transaction reporting. Having assessed some of the theoretical effects of these aspects by looking at the new incentives they offer participants in the energy markets, this article has advanced two arguments. First, if the Commission wishes to strengthen the regulation of trade in energy derivatives, it should extend this regulation to all market participants. There are no compelling arguments to exempt non-financial institutions, such as energy companies. Second, it would be misguided to expect that stepping up regulation of energy derivatives trading automatically reduces volatility; neither in the financial, nor in the physical energy markets. The precise link between derivatives trading remains unclear, the political discourse itself has added to volatility and this legislation may have some ambiguous and unintended effects. Therefore, it would be advisable to take a more cautious stance and carefully weigh the various costs and benefits. If the Commission decides to push through with the whole package, a few caveats are in order. First, overlaps and gaps between the several regulations should be avoided. For instance, it would be sensible to establish a single regulator for the energy sector instead of conferring competences upon four different ones. Gaps exists between definitions. For example, REMIT defines inside information by referring to the owner of the product. Financial legislation on the other hand refers to the originator. It is unclear which one of the two is responsible for the reporting and transparency obligations. Another caveat relates to the confidence in the political discourse in increased regulation and the ability of regulators to prevent financial crises. Being engulfed in transaction data does not mean regulators will have the knowledge or the agility to immediately act upon it. It may be a necessary measure, but it is by no means sufficient. A third risk the Commission needs to avoid is policy inconsistency. It should be careful not to implement regulation with the aim of reducing volatility, but with the sole effect of deteriorating liquidity. This only adds to volatility. Moreover, maybe too many (conflicting) objectives are simultaneously pursued for the energy markets. These range from liberalized and competitive energy markets, security of supply, reasonable consumer prices, environmental sustainability, stable financial markets, energy price volatility to energy price moderation. It is important to keep the famous Tinbergen rule in mind: for each policy target there usually has to be at least one policy instrument. Increased regulation is one instrument, but cannot be sufficient to accomplish all these targets simultaneously.

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