قیمت برق و رفتار ژنراتور در بازارهای برق حوضچه ای ناخالص
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|57394||2013||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||9081 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 63, December 2013, Pages 628–637
Electricity market liberalisation has become common practice internationally. The justification for this process has been to enhance competition in a market traditionally characterised by statutory monopolies in an attempt to reduce costs to end-users. This paper endeavours to see whether a pool market achieves this goal of increasing competition and reducing electricity prices. Here the electricity market is set up as a sealed bid second price auction. Theory predicts that such markets should result with firms bidding their marginal cost, thereby resulting in an efficient outcome and lower costs to consumers. The Irish electricity system with a gross pool market experiences among the highest electricity prices in Europe. Thus, we analyse the Irish pool system econometrically in order to test if the high electricity prices seen there are due to participants bidding outside of market rules or out of line with theory. Overall we do not find any evidence that the interaction between generator and the pool in the Irish electricity market is not efficient. Thus, the pool element of the market structure does not explain the high electricity prices experienced in Ireland.