تعادل نش نامتقارن در مزایده حقوق انتشار
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|58531||2012||7 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||3967 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 79, Issue 3, March 2012, Pages 429–435
This paper studies the problems of emission rights auctions, and presents a uniform price auction mechanism based on three assumptions, i.e., all buyers are asymmetric, every buyer submits a nonincreasing continuous demand function, and every buyer's valuation to per unit of the emission rights is common value information. It focuses on solving the asymmetric Nash equilibrium for this auction mechanism. It concludes that there exist multiple Nash equilibria in our auction mechanism, but the arbitrary low equilibrium prices cannot emerge. We also give several suggestions on how to induce the auction to a desired ideal equilibrium state in mechanism design of emission rights auctions.