در پاییز سال 2002، فرایند تحلیل شبکه ای (ANP) راه بهتری برای مقابله با عراق را نشان داده است
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|6074||2007||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8365 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Mathematical and Computer Modelling, Volume 46, Issues 7–8, October 2007, Pages 1130–1143
In 2003, the United States launched a pre-emptive strike against Iraq which was largely defended by the Bush Administration as an act to protect national security. In the months leading up to the attack, however, the US was still in the decision-making process — should we work with the UN on enforcing sanctions? go in only with Allied support? launch a pre-emptive strike with mainly US forces? During this time, the Analytic Network Process [T.L. Saaty, The Analytic Network Process, Fundamentals of Decision Making and Priority Theory, second ed., RWS Publications, Pittsburgh, 2001] was used to determine the best course of action. Working with the UN to ensure weapons inspections was found to be the best choice; the model showed that other alternatives, such as a pre-emptive attack on Iraq or attacking Iraq with Allied help would increase the possibility of such risks as increased oil prices, increased terrorism, decreased domestic support for the war, and high economic costs of sustaining the war itself.
1.1. Background of the problem This analysis is not a Monday morning quarter backing exercise, because it was done several months prior to the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq. The detailed finding was that, with substantially greater priority, the US should work with the United Nations to deal with the problem (namely that of the possibility of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq). At the time this Analytic Network Process (ANP) model  was developed, the assumption was that Iraq could, in fact, be harboring WMD. Nonetheless, possible costs and risks, such as the high monetary cost to the US, as well as the possibility of increased terrorism, US military casualties, world opinion turning against the US for a pre-emptive strike, and ‘winning the battle but losing the war’ in terms of the descent of Iraq into civil conflict and decreasing support of the war by the American public, all led to the model predicting working with the UN to enforce sanctions as the best proposed alternative. On March 13, 2003, the second Gulf War, termed ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ by the US Administration began; the complex relationship between the United States and Iraq, however, had begun years before. In 1972, Saddam Hussein forcibly rose to power in Iraq; 16 years later, Hussein took the opportunity afforded by a cease-fire in the Iran–Iraq war to rebuild his military, aided by funds and technology from Western Europe and the United States. In January 1991, a US–led international coalition began using both air and ground force against Iraqi forces after a UN demand to withdraw from Kuwait was ignored. In April 1991, a cease-fire was agreed to and UN sanctions were imposed; the sanctions were to remain in place until certain conditions, including Iraq ending its WMD program, were met. In 1995, the UN began the “oil-for-food” program when fears arose that the sanctions were reducing Iraqi civilian quality of life to a point where access to food and medicine were compromised. Under the program, Iraq was permitted to buy food and medicine using proceeds from oil exports, even though the exporting of oil was banned under the embargo. In November 1998, UN weapons inspectors were withdrawn after it was claimed that Hussein made it impossible for them to verify whether Iraq had chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, as prohibited by the 1991 agreement. The following month, “Operation Desert Fox”, executed by US and British forces, began four days of airstrikes against Iraqi weaponry targets. September 11, 2001, however, was the catalyst for a resurgence of national and international attention on Iraq. The following day, President George W. Bush made a speech to the UN General Assembly stating that Hussein was violating commitments made at the conclusion of the first Gulf War, including promises to end WMD programs and improve human rights. The following month, the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002 was passed in the US Congress. In November, the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 demanded that Iraq comply with its disarmament obligations as well as previous resolutions on human rights, terrorism and prisoners of war. Although Iraq agreed to the resolution and UNMOVIC began inspections that same month, the veracity of Iraq’s cooperation was disputed. In February 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke to the UN Security Council regarding the threat that Hussein’s regime posed; the Bush Administration also claimed, at this time, that Iraq had ties to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations and was still developing WMD. The following month, a US-led coalition invaded Iraq. Having completed this analysis before the US made the decision to launch a pre-emptive attack on Iraq, it is interesting to look back at the results in light of events that have transpired since that time. WMDs were never found, and domestic support for the war has diminished as our war debt increases and Iraq itself spirals into what some claim is a civil war. What follows is the decision-making model, understanding of the issue, analysis and recommendations as they emerged from the study in the fall of 2002.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Without question, foreign policy decisions necessitate the consideration of all possible options. In the case of the United States and Iraq, however, the decision was one of prime importance, given the future repercussions of both countries’ actions in 2002. At the time, we felt that the decision of the United States would be based on an educated guess as to whether Iraq possessed either nuclear WMD or the means to make them. We now know that faulty intelligence was used to convince the public that Iraq was harboring WMD. Regardless, the ANP was successfully used in 2002 to examine the short-term, and possible long-term, effects of engaging Iraq in war, unilaterally or not. In 2002, the following conclusion was reached by the author of this paper: President Bush’s insistence on viewing the United States in the context of a unipolar world, rather than conceding that a larger picture exists, may in fact stifle any progressive foreign policy decisions. In general, he and his administration have shown little concern for the rest of the world’s response to his protectionist policies. Further, his consistent movement toward unilateral action should be alarming at least, and should incite a dialogue that is currently absent. Repeated public opinion polls demonstrate that the American public is uncertain at best when faced with whether or not to engage Iraq — is this the shaky foundation on which a military campaign should be launched? At the very least, these are questions that must be asked, despite the current American climate of patriotism and, perhaps, superiority. Unilateral action against Iraq, coupled with other recent protectionist policies, may serve only to portray US interests as superior and valid, and our needs and wants as the exception to every rule, inviting only disdain and opposition from the rest of the world. In short, using pre-emptive, unilateral force has a high potential of both alienating allies and negatively affecting America’s long-term interests. In addition, pre-emptive action might incite the use of WMD in retaliation, as well as create further instability in the Middle East and within Iraq, as the country is left in the hands of warring factions with Iraqi citizens at their mercy. It cannot be denied that Iraq poses a threat to both the United States and the world, and that Hussein is a leader that must be contended with. Unchecked, he represents the quintessential example of both absolute power and absolute corruption, unfettered by the reins of conscience, ethics, morality or religious beliefs. However, the question, as stated at the beginning of this paper, is not whether to engage Iraq, but rather, how and when. Weapons inspectors have not been in the country since 1998; surely, the US could take the time necessary to carry out the appropriate dialogue in both the public and political/diplomatic arenas in order to gain both allied and public support, fully consider both the depth and scope of the operation (including anticipated costs), as well as to formulate a plausible plan for what will become of an Iraq absent of the Hussein regime. The logistics of this operation are being glossed over by the Bush administration. The importance of allied and public support is being dangerously underplayed. The Administration is spouting the rhetoric of “force as a last resort”, even as it dismisses UN authority through House resolutions. There is no good faith here, on the part of either country. In the end, there is only one plan that is truly in the best interests of both the United States and the world. The UN must move to expediently pass a resolution calling for a new, tougher inspection regime. Absent Iraqi cooperation, there must be a multilateral move to forcefully search out and destroy Iraqi WMD and related programs. Simultaneously, the Arab world must be actively engaged and consulted, as the West should be mindful that Western-led authority will neither have legitimacy nor longevity, and that Iraq, left entirely to her own devices, would likely dissolve into the hands of warring factions. There are goals here: protecting oil reserves, improving life for Iraqi civilians, building bridges with the Arab world, maintaining focus on the domestic economy, and strengthening our ties both with our allies and IGOs. Simply put, there is not enough support, at home or worldwide, for pre-emptive unilateral action, and the US cannot afford the risks involved. The wisest choice remains to first exhaust diplomatic measures …hoping for the best, but preparing for the possible necessity of allied intervention. There is a larger picture here, however, that must be considered. Yes, Iraq must comply with inspections. Yes, Iraq must be rid of WMD and related programs. Yes, the days of Saddam Hussein’s regime ought to be numbered. However, the shaping of foreign policy never hinges on one single decision at one moment in time. There is a definite shift to unilateralism and a push for American hegemony. There is a noticeable absence of dialogue and debate regarding the past, current and future actions of a “wartime” president. There are too many decisions being made and accepted in the name of fear — breeding protectionist, isolationist policies cloaked in patriotism and politics. There is, very nearly, a policy of paralysis regarding common sense, active debate, prudent fiscal decisions and long-term repercussions. Not attacking pre-emptively is a message that will give the US a better response on many fronts, and in the long-term. If Iraq must be engaged militarily, then let it be by a multilateral allied force, sharing in both the costs and the risks. The results and conclusion, as stated above and composed in 2002, have proven to be quite prophetic in nature. In the years since Operation Iraqi Freedom began, American public support has indeed diminished and the costs of the war have risen to over 300 billion dollars, with the total cost project to surpass one trillion dollars . The risks of US and Iraqi casualties have materialized; since the war began in March 2003, almost 2700 Americans have died, over 20,000 have been wounded, and over 40,000 Iraqi civilians have died . The cost of the war is also seen in high oil prices and increased terrorism, as well as further destabilization of the Middle East. While the US-led pre-emptive strike was justified largely with the rationale of overcoming security risks to the US, in our current situation, one could ask whether we are indeed more secure today than four years ago. It would have been far better to work with the UN than to be the leader of a few allies. Iraq would have thought that they were fighting the whole world instead of just the United States. At this point, the United States remains in an unyielding Catch-22: withdraw troops, leaving Iraq to be ruled by whichever faction emerges victorious from the current state of civil war, or maintain troops, even as support for the war diminishes and the monetary and casualty toll grows higher. Given the current state of affairs, ‘winning’ no longer seems to be an option.